s11竞猜平台

民商(shang)(shang)法(fa)论(lun)(lun)文(wen)栏(lan)目提(ti)供最新(xin)民商(shang)(shang)法(fa)论(lun)(lun)文(wen)格式、民商(shang)(shang)法(fa)硕士论(lun)(lun)文(wen)范文(wen)。详(xiang)情咨(zi)询QQ:357500023(论(lun)(lun)文(wen)辅导)

董事会经营决策权的体系构造

日(ri)期:2021年09月(yue)08日(ri) 编辑(ji):ad201107111759308692 作(zuo)者(zhe):s11竞猜平台 点击次数:0
论文价格:150元/篇 论(lun)文编(bian)号:lw202108291733437796 论(lun)文字数:35263 所属栏目:民商法论文
论文地区:中国 论文(wen)语种:中(zhong)文(wen) 论(lun)文用(yong)途:硕士毕业(ye)论(lun)文 Master Thesis
相关标签:民法论文

本文是一篇民商法论文,笔者认(ren)为董(dong)(dong)事(shi)会(hui)经(jing)营(ying)决(jue)策(ce)权(quan)(quan)的(de)(de)(de)明(ming)确(que)对于合理(li)配置公(gong)司(si)各主(zhu)体的(de)(de)(de)经(jing)营(ying)决(jue)策(ce)权(quan)(quan)有着重大意义,在(zai)公(gong)开公(gong)司(si)确(que)定权(quan)(quan)力划分标准时(shi),一方面(mian),在(zai)确(que)定董(dong)(dong)事(shi)会(hui)与股东会(hui)的(de)(de)(de)职(zhi)权(quan)(quan)分配时(shi),董(dong)(dong)事(shi)会(hui)基于其专业性、保护中小(xiao)股东以及责任主(zhu)体明(ming)确(que)等方面(mian)的(de)(de)(de)优(you)势,应确(que)立董(dong)(dong)事(shi)会(hui)优(you)位(wei)主(zhu)义,另一方面(mian),在(zai)确(que)定董(dong)(dong)事(shi)会(hui)与经(jing)理(li)间的(de)(de)(de)职(zhi)权(quan)(quan)分配时(shi),董(dong)(dong)事(shi)会(hui)基于群体决(jue)策(ce)的(de)(de)(de)优(you)势,在(zai)进行(xing)重大决(jue)策(ce)时(shi)又比经(jing)理(li)的(de)(de)(de)个人决(jue)策(ce)更加(jia)科学稳妥(tuo),因此仍然应遵循董(dong)(dong)事(shi)会(hui)优(you)位(wei)主(zhu)义。


第一章  董事会经营决策权的制度演进


一、经(jing)营决(jue)策权的概念厘定

经(jing)(jing)(jing)(jing)营(ying)(ying)(ying)决策权(quan)(quan)(quan)(quan)(quan)的定(ding)(ding)义离(li)不开对经(jing)(jing)(jing)(jing)营(ying)(ying)(ying)权(quan)(quan)(quan)(quan)(quan)的探讨。现代公(gong)(gong)司(si)(si)治理结构的基础是(shi)(shi)(shi)两权(quan)(quan)(quan)(quan)(quan)分离(li),①具体而(er)言,公(gong)(gong)司(si)(si)的资(zi)本来源(yuan)于股东的出(chu)资(zi),因(yin)此股东被(bei)认为是(shi)(shi)(shi)公(gong)(gong)司(si)(si)资(zi)本的所有(you)(you)(you)者,但是(shi)(shi)(shi)在(zai)(zai)公(gong)(gong)司(si)(si)发(fa)展(zhan)过程中(zhong)(zhong),股东却逐渐无法(fa)介入公(gong)(gong)司(si)(si)经(jing)(jing)(jing)(jing)营(ying)(ying)(ying),②呈(cheng)现出(chu)所有(you)(you)(you)权(quan)(quan)(quan)(quan)(quan)与经(jing)(jing)(jing)(jing)营(ying)(ying)(ying)权(quan)(quan)(quan)(quan)(quan)分离(li)的状态(tai)。我国(guo) 1988 年制(zhi)定(ding)(ding)实施的《中(zhong)(zhong)华人民共和国(guo)全民所有(you)(you)(you)制(zhi)工业(ye)企(qi)业(ye)法(fa)》第 2 条③明(ming)确提(ti)到所有(you)(you)(you)权(quan)(quan)(quan)(quan)(quan)与经(jing)(jing)(jing)(jing)营(ying)(ying)(ying)权(quan)(quan)(quan)(quan)(quan)分离(li)的原则,此规定(ding)(ding)中(zhong)(zhong)的经(jing)(jing)(jing)(jing)营(ying)(ying)(ying)权(quan)(quan)(quan)(quan)(quan)包含对财(cai)产(chan)的占(zhan)有(you)(you)(you)、使用和处分的权(quan)(quan)(quan)(quan)(quan)利,即占(zhan)有(you)(you)(you)、使用和处分权(quan)(quan)(quan)(quan)(quan)能均蕴(yun)含在(zai)(zai)所有(you)(you)(you)权(quan)(quan)(quan)(quan)(quan)之(zhi)中(zhong)(zhong),换言之(zhi),在(zai)(zai)此种定(ding)(ding)义之(zhi)下,经(jing)(jing)(jing)(jing)营(ying)(ying)(ying)权(quan)(quan)(quan)(quan)(quan)是(shi)(shi)(shi)蕴(yun)含在(zai)(zai)所有(you)(you)(you)权(quan)(quan)(quan)(quan)(quan)之(zhi)中(zhong)(zhong),④所谓(wei)经(jing)(jing)(jing)(jing)营(ying)(ying)(ying)权(quan)(quan)(quan)(quan)(quan)就是(shi)(shi)(shi)企(qi)业(ye)享有(you)(you)(you)的对企(qi)业(ye)财(cai)产(chan)的经(jing)(jing)(jing)(jing)营(ying)(ying)(ying)权(quan)(quan)(quan)(quan)(quan),此权(quan)(quan)(quan)(quan)(quan)源(yuan)于企(qi)业(ye)的财(cai)产(chan)所有(you)(you)(you)权(quan)(quan)(quan)(quan)(quan),⑤学者间也(ye)由此定(ding)(ding)义生发(fa)经(jing)(jing)(jing)(jing)营(ying)(ying)(ying)权(quan)(quan)(quan)(quan)(quan)为自物权(quan)(quan)(quan)(quan)(quan)还是(shi)(shi)(shi)他(ta)物权(quan)(quan)(quan)(quan)(quan)的争论。

此(ci)种对(dui)于经(jing)(jing)营(ying)(ying)权(quan)的定义与(yu)理(li)(li)(li)解(jie)(jie)源自我国早期(qi)立(li)法规定,但可以(yi)说该种定义与(yu)理(li)(li)(li)解(jie)(jie)与(yu)现(xian)代公司(si)治理(li)(li)(li)理(li)(li)(li)论中的经(jing)(jing)营(ying)(ying)权(quan)相去(qu)甚远,对(dui)经(jing)(jing)营(ying)(ying)权(quan)的理(li)(li)(li)解(jie)(jie)不应(ying)以(yi)民法之所有权(quan)与(yu)物权(quan)的角度来解(jie)(jie)读,而(er)应(ying)从现(xian)代公司(si)治理(li)(li)(li)的角度进行理(li)(li)(li)解(jie)(jie)。事实上经(jing)(jing)营(ying)(ying)权(quan)即可简单理(li)(li)(li)解(jie)(jie)为(wei)经(jing)(jing)营(ying)(ying)公司(si)的权(quan)力,而(er)什么是(shi)(shi)经(jing)(jing)营(ying)(ying)?经(jing)(jing)营(ying)(ying)即是(shi)(shi)指(zhi)对(dui)于公司(si)事务的管理(li)(li)(li),包括对(dui)内管理(li)(li)(li)公司(si)经(jing)(jing)营(ying)(ying)事务,对(dui)外代表公司(si)开展业(ye)务活动,由此(ci)可知经(jing)(jing)营(ying)(ying)是(shi)(shi)一个(ge)(ge)综合性概(gai)念,经(jing)(jing)营(ying)(ying)权(quan)也是(shi)(shi)一个(ge)(ge)复合性概(gai)念。而(er)何谓决策(ce)(ce)权(quan)呢?有学者(zhe)根据决策(ce)(ce)行使的步(bu)骤,将决策(ce)(ce)权(quan)做进一步(bu)细(xi)化,分为(wei)“决策(ce)(ce)管理(li)(li)(li)”与(yu)“决策(ce)(ce)控制”,前(qian)者(zhe)主要是(shi)(shi)指(zhi)方(fang)案的提(ti)出与(yu)执(zhi)行,而(er)后者(zhe)则是(shi)(shi)指(zhi)方(fang)案审(shen)批与(yu)对(dui)执(zhi)行监督。

因此经营(ying)决(jue)策(ce)(ce)(ce)权(quan)(quan)(quan)(quan)的概念(nian)也(ye)拨雾见月,即是指(zhi)在公(gong)(gong)司经营(ying)管理过(guo)程中(zhong)享有(you)的决(jue)策(ce)(ce)(ce)权(quan)(quan)(quan)(quan)限,包括对(dui)(dui)(dui)(dui)(dui)经营(ying)管理中(zhong)提(ti)出决(jue)策(ce)(ce)(ce)方案(an)、对(dui)(dui)(dui)(dui)(dui)决(jue)策(ce)(ce)(ce)予以审(shen)批、执行决(jue)策(ce)(ce)(ce)以及对(dui)(dui)(dui)(dui)(dui)执行进行监督(du)的复(fu)合性权(quan)(quan)(quan)(quan)力,通俗而言就(jiu)是在公(gong)(gong)司运营(ying)过(guo)程,决(jue)定(ding)做什么和(he)如何做的权(quan)(quan)(quan)(quan)力。②“董事会的经营(ying)决(jue)策(ce)(ce)(ce)权(quan)(quan)(quan)(quan)”的概念(nian)也(ye)随之明朗,即是指(zhi)董事会享有(you)的对(dui)(dui)(dui)(dui)(dui)内经营(ying)公(gong)(gong)司、对(dui)(dui)(dui)(dui)(dui)外从事交易等活动的决(jue)定(ding)权(quan)(quan)(quan)(quan)。

.........................


二、董事会经(jing)营决策权的职能定位及立法表述

(一)不同治理(li)模式中董事会的职能(neng)定位

如前所述,董事会(hui)在不(bu)同治(zhi)(zhi)理(li)结(jie)构(gou)中的(de)职能(neng)有所不(bu)同,兼具(ju)决(jue)策、执行和监督职能(neng),而(er)本文(wen)之(zhi)所以讨论董事会(hui)的(de)经营决(jue)策权,是因为在我国公司治(zhi)(zhi)理(li)模式之(zhi)下,董事会(hui)的(de)核心职能(neng)在于决(jue)策,而(er)非执行和监督。

1.单(dan)层(ceng)模式

单层模式以美国为例,公司(si)(si)(si)治理(li)的(de)(de)(de)主(zhu)(zhu)要(yao)(yao)机构(gou)就只有股东会(hui)(hui)与董(dong)事(shi)会(hui)(hui),不(bu)设监(jian)(jian)事(shi)会(hui)(hui),董(dong)事(shi)会(hui)(hui)由股东选举,且(qie)通(tong)常下设各种(zhong)委员(yuan)(yuan)会(hui)(hui),以满足其行(xing)(xing)使(shi)经营(ying)决策权(quan)和(he)(he)(he)监(jian)(jian)督权(quan)的(de)(de)(de)职(zhi)能(neng)(neng)要(yao)(yao)求,如(ru)执行(xing)(xing)、审(shen)计(ji)、提名及(ji)(ji)(ji)报(bao)酬等委员(yuan)(yuan)会(hui)(hui)是(shi)(shi)常设的(de)(de)(de)委员(yuan)(yuan)会(hui)(hui)。美国法律研(yan)究所对董(dong)事(shi)会(hui)(hui)职(zhi)权(quan)做(zuo)如(ru)下描(miao)述:“1.遴选、评估以及(ji)(ji)(ji)在恰当的(de)(de)(de)时候解(jie)雇主(zhu)(zhu)要(yao)(yao)的(de)(de)(de)资深经理(li)人(ren)(ren)员(yuan)(yuan)。2.以发(fa)展(zhan)的(de)(de)(de)观点监(jian)(jian)督公司(si)(si)(si)的(de)(de)(de)商(shang)业行(xing)(xing)为,公司(si)(si)(si)资源管(guan)理(li)是(shi)(shi)否始终如(ru)一(yi)(在法律和(he)(he)(he)道德允许的(de)(de)(de)情况下增加(jia)股东收益,同时又为公众福利和(he)(he)(he)人(ren)(ren)道主(zhu)(zhu)义事(shi)业做(zuo)出(chu)贡(gong)献(xian))。3.审(shen)查与批准(zhun)董(dong)事(shi)会(hui)(hui)和(he)(he)(he)主(zhu)(zhu)要(yao)(yao)高级经理(li)人(ren)(ren)提出(chu)的(de)(de)(de)公司(si)(si)(si)发(fa)展(zhan)计(ji)划及(ji)(ji)(ji)行(xing)(xing)动(dong)。在董(dong)事(shi)会(hui)(hui)注(zhu)重的(de)(de)(de)会(hui)(hui)计(ji)准(zhun)则中(zhong)(zhong),这(zhei)些(xie)计(ji)划及(ji)(ji)(ji)行(xing)(xing)动(dong)是(shi)(shi)董(dong)事(shi)会(hui)(hui)与主(zhu)(zhu)要(yao)(yao)高级经理(li)人(ren)(ren)要(yao)(yao)考虑的(de)(de)(de)大前提与变革(ge)。4.执行(xing)(xing)其他(ta)一(yi)些(xie)职(zhi)能(neng)(neng),如(ru)法律规定的(de)(de)(de)职(zhi)能(neng)(neng),或(huo)者董(dong)事(shi)会(hui)(hui)根(gen)据公司(si)(si)(si)准(zhun)则制定的(de)(de)(de)职(zhi)能(neng)(neng)。”④这(zhei)些(xie)职(zhi)能(neng)(neng)基本上涵盖了美国公司(si)(si)(si)治理(li)结构(gou)中(zhong)(zhong)董(dong)事(shi)会(hui)(hui)的(de)(de)(de)基本职(zhi)能(neng)(neng),⑤可见在这(zhei)种(zhong)模式中(zhong)(zhong),董(dong)事(shi)会(hui)(hui)成为集经营(ying)决策和(he)(he)(he)监(jian)(jian)督于一(yi)体(ti)的(de)(de)(de)主(zhu)(zhu)要(yao)(yao)公司(si)(si)(si)机关,是(shi)(shi)真(zhen)正影(ying)响公司(si)(si)(si)治理(li)的(de)(de)(de)主(zhu)(zhu)体(ti)。

2.双层模式

双(shuang)层模(mo)式又(you)称二(er)元制公(gong)(gong)(gong)司治(zhi)理(li)结构,在(zai)此模(mo)式中(zhong)(zhong)(zhong),监(jian)(jian)(jian)事(shi)(shi)(shi)会(hui)(hui)(hui)由(you)股东(dong)会(hui)(hui)(hui)和雇员委员会(hui)(hui)(hui)共同(tong)(tong)选举(ju)产生,再(zai)由(you)监(jian)(jian)(jian)事(shi)(shi)(shi)会(hui)(hui)(hui)选举(ju)产生董事(shi)(shi)(shi)会(hui)(hui)(hui),也即监(jian)(jian)(jian)事(shi)(shi)(shi)会(hui)(hui)(hui)与(yu)董事(shi)(shi)(shi)会(hui)(hui)(hui)属(shu)于上下位的(de)(de)(de)层级关系,①采(cai)用(yong)此模(mo)式的(de)(de)(de)典(dian)型代(dai)表(biao)国家(jia)是德国。在(zai)双(shuang)层模(mo)式中(zhong)(zhong)(zhong),监(jian)(jian)(jian)事(shi)(shi)(shi)会(hui)(hui)(hui)居于公(gong)(gong)(gong)司治(zhi)理(li)的(de)(de)(de)中(zhong)(zhong)(zhong)心地位,在(zai)公(gong)(gong)(gong)司治(zhi)理(li)中(zhong)(zhong)(zhong)拥有(you)(you)极(ji)大(da)的(de)(de)(de)权力(li),除监(jian)(jian)(jian)督董事(shi)(shi)(shi)会(hui)(hui)(hui)的(de)(de)(de)经(jing)(jing)营行为外,监(jian)(jian)(jian)事(shi)(shi)(shi)会(hui)(hui)(hui)对董事(shi)(shi)(shi)享有(you)(you)任免权以(yi)及报酬决定权,还可以(yi)向董事(shi)(shi)(shi)会(hui)(hui)(hui)提出决策(ce)建议(yi),甚(shen)至(zhi)享有(you)(you)对公(gong)(gong)(gong)司长远(yuan)发展战略,重(zhong)大(da)融资项(xiang)目(mu)等重(zhong)大(da)业(ye)务(wu)的(de)(de)(de)批准权,对于此类重(zhong)大(da)事(shi)(shi)(shi)项(xiang),董事(shi)(shi)(shi)会(hui)(hui)(hui)需在(zai)监(jian)(jian)(jian)事(shi)(shi)(shi)会(hui)(hui)(hui)许(xu)可后方可执行,但监(jian)(jian)(jian)事(shi)(shi)(shi)会(hui)(hui)(hui)不得直(zhi)接参与(yu)公(gong)(gong)(gong)司业(ye)务(wu)的(de)(de)(de)经(jing)(jing)营管(guan)理(li)。而董事(shi)(shi)(shi)会(hui)(hui)(hui)主要负(fu)责(ze)公(gong)(gong)(gong)司的(de)(de)(de)日常(chang)经(jing)(jing)营管(guan)理(li),并接受监(jian)(jian)(jian)事(shi)(shi)(shi)会(hui)(hui)(hui)的(de)(de)(de)监(jian)(jian)(jian)督。德国监(jian)(jian)(jian)事(shi)(shi)(shi)会(hui)(hui)(hui)在(zai)公(gong)(gong)(gong)司中(zhong)(zhong)(zhong)的(de)(de)(de)地位及享有(you)(you)的(de)(de)(de)权力(li)十分类似于单层公(gong)(gong)(gong)司治(zhi)理(li)模(mo)式下的(de)(de)(de)董事(shi)(shi)(shi)会(hui)(hui)(hui),而德国的(de)(de)(de)董事(shi)(shi)(shi)会(hui)(hui)(hui)仅负(fu)责(ze)公(gong)(gong)(gong)司日常(chang)经(jing)(jing)营业(ye)务(wu),同(tong)(tong)时对于重(zhong)大(da)事(shi)(shi)(shi)项(xiang)并没有(you)(you)决策(ce)权,其核心职能主要是执行公(gong)(gong)(gong)司业(ye)务(wu)。

................................


第二章  公开公司董事会经营决策权的理论范式


一、公(gong)开公(gong)司治(zhi)理的基础法(fa)理

公(gong)(gong)司(si)(si)(si)(si)经(jing)(jing)(jing)营决(jue)策权为(wei)(wei)经(jing)(jing)(jing)营权最重要(yao)的(de)(de)(de)(de)权限之一,明(ming)确(que)董事会经(jing)(jing)(jing)营决(jue)策权范围的(de)(de)(de)(de)目的(de)(de)(de)(de)是(shi)为(wei)(wei)了实现更好(hao)的(de)(de)(de)(de)公(gong)(gong)司(si)(si)(si)(si)治理(li)(li)目标,而(er)(er)首要(yao)应解决(jue)的(de)(de)(de)(de)是(shi)公(gong)(gong)司(si)(si)(si)(si)治理(li)(li)的(de)(de)(de)(de)目标是(shi)什么,一方(fang)面要(yao)明(ming)确(que)公(gong)(gong)司(si)(si)(si)(si)的(de)(de)(de)(de)本质,公(gong)(gong)司(si)(si)(si)(si)是(shi)为(wei)(wei)谁的(de)(de)(de)(de)利益而(er)(er)经(jing)(jing)(jing)营,即(ji)企(qi)(qi)业的(de)(de)(de)(de)本质问题,另一方(fang)面是(shi)如何进行合理(li)(li)权力配置以实现公(gong)(gong)司(si)(si)(si)(si)经(jing)(jing)(jing)营目标,即(ji)公(gong)(gong)司(si)(si)(si)(si)治理(li)(li)问题。这两(liang)方(fang)面中前(qian)者属于(yu)(yu)经(jing)(jing)(jing)济视(shi)角,后者属于(yu)(yu)法律(lv)视(shi)角,二者属于(yu)(yu)一体(ti)两(liang)面的(de)(de)(de)(de)关系,公(gong)(gong)司(si)(si)(si)(si)的(de)(de)(de)(de)治理(li)(li)理(li)(li)论离(li)不开对(dui)于(yu)(yu)企(qi)(qi)业理(li)(li)论的(de)(de)(de)(de)认识。②在回答此问题的(de)(de)(de)(de)基础上(shang),进一步决(jue)定(ding)经(jing)(jing)(jing)营决(jue)策权应该分(fen)多少给董事会。纵观已有的(de)(de)(de)(de)企(qi)(qi)业理(li)(li)论与公(gong)(gong)司(si)(si)(si)(si)治理(li)(li)理(li)(li)论,主要(yao)讨论的(de)(de)(de)(de)是(shi)以下几种理(li)(li)论:

(一)公司契约论——代理理论

公(gong)(gong)(gong)(gong)司(si)(si)(si)契(qi)(qi)约(yue)(yue)(yue)论又称为法经(jing)济学理(li)(li)(li)(li)论,该(gai)理(li)(li)(li)(li)论认(ren)为公(gong)(gong)(gong)(gong)司(si)(si)(si)就(jiu)是(shi)(shi)各参与人(ren)(ren)(ren)通过明(ming)示或默示的(de)(de)(de)(de)(de)契(qi)(qi)约(yue)(yue)(yue)所(suo)(suo)组成(cheng)(cheng)的(de)(de)(de)(de)(de)契(qi)(qi)约(yue)(yue)(yue)网。在(zai)这(zhei)种理(li)(li)(li)(li)论之(zhi)下(xia),公(gong)(gong)(gong)(gong)司(si)(si)(si)的(de)(de)(de)(de)(de)实(shi)质是(shi)(shi)一组契(qi)(qi)约(yue)(yue)(yue),而非为一个真正的(de)(de)(de)(de)(de)实(shi)体(ti)(ti)。在(zai)这(zhei)组契(qi)(qi)约(yue)(yue)(yue)中(zhong),股(gu)东(dong)(dong)是(shi)(shi)公(gong)(gong)(gong)(gong)司(si)(si)(si)剩余财(cai)产的(de)(de)(de)(de)(de)索(suo)取者(zhe)(zhe),也是(shi)(shi)公(gong)(gong)(gong)(gong)司(si)(si)(si)风险的(de)(de)(de)(de)(de)承担(dan)者(zhe)(zhe),该(gai)特(te)征符(fu)合所(suo)(suo)有(you)(you)权(quan)的(de)(de)(de)(de)(de)基本特(te)征,因(yin)此公(gong)(gong)(gong)(gong)司(si)(si)(si)的(de)(de)(de)(de)(de)所(suo)(suo)有(you)(you)人(ren)(ren)(ren)就(jiu)是(shi)(shi)股(gu)东(dong)(dong),公(gong)(gong)(gong)(gong)司(si)(si)(si)治理(li)(li)(li)(li)亦应奉行股(gu)东(dong)(dong)利(li)益(yi)至(zhi)上(shang)原则(ze),换言(yan)之(zhi),公(gong)(gong)(gong)(gong)司(si)(si)(si)经(jing)营目标(biao)(biao)就(jiu)是(shi)(shi)实(shi)现(xian)股(gu)东(dong)(dong)利(li)益(yi)的(de)(de)(de)(de)(de)最(zui)大(da)化,在(zai)此目标(biao)(biao)之(zhi)下(xia),董(dong)事会等经(jing)营管理(li)(li)(li)(li)人(ren)(ren)(ren)员(yuan)只是(shi)(shi)股(gu)东(dong)(dong)会为实(shi)现(xian)利(li)益(yi)最(zui)大(da)化而选任的(de)(de)(de)(de)(de)代理(li)(li)(li)(li)人(ren)(ren)(ren)。在(zai)这(zhei)组契(qi)(qi)约(yue)(yue)(yue)当中(zhong),董(dong)事会成(cheng)(cheng)为与各个主体(ti)(ti)签订合同的(de)(de)(de)(de)(de)集合点所(suo)(suo)在(zai),加之(zhi)所(suo)(suo)有(you)(you)权(quan)与经(jing)营权(quan)随着公(gong)(gong)(gong)(gong)司(si)(si)(si)的(de)(de)(de)(de)(de)发展逐渐分(fen)离开来,董(dong)事会在(zai)公(gong)(gong)(gong)(gong)司(si)(si)(si)实(shi)际(ji)经(jing)营过程中(zhong)享有(you)(you)相(xiang)当大(da)的(de)(de)(de)(de)(de)权(quan)限,成(cheng)(cheng)为公(gong)(gong)(gong)(gong)司(si)(si)(si)治理(li)(li)(li)(li)结构的(de)(de)(de)(de)(de)中(zhong)心(xin)。简言(yan)之(zhi),股(gu)东(dong)(dong)利(li)益(yi)最(zui)大(da)化是(shi)(shi)公(gong)(gong)(gong)(gong)司(si)(si)(si)经(jing)营的(de)(de)(de)(de)(de)目标(biao)(biao),股(gu)东(dong)(dong)在(zai)公(gong)(gong)(gong)(gong)司(si)(si)(si)中(zhong)有(you)(you)至(zhi)高的(de)(de)(de)(de)(de)法律地(di)位,作(zuo)为其代理(li)(li)(li)(li)人(ren)(ren)(ren)的(de)(de)(de)(de)(de)董(dong)事会也理(li)(li)(li)(li)应成(cheng)(cheng)为公(gong)(gong)(gong)(gong)司(si)(si)(si)治理(li)(li)(li)(li)结构安(an)排中(zhong)的(de)(de)(de)(de)(de)中(zhong)心(xin)。

但该理论也(ye)受(shou)(shou)到(dao)挑战和质疑。公(gong)司契(qi)约(yue)论是将公(gong)司本身看作一(yi)个(ge)市场(chang),各个(ge)参(can)与(yu)(yu)(yu)(yu)人(ren)之所以(yi)选择公(gong)司的形式,只是因为这种模式能够降低(di)代理成本,并认(ren)为虽然公(gong)司经营以(yi)股(gu)东利益最大(da)化(hua)为目(mu)标,但是其他(ta)(ta)参(can)与(yu)(yu)(yu)(yu)人(ren)的利益若因此受(shou)(shou)到(dao)损害,其他(ta)(ta)参(can)与(yu)(yu)(yu)(yu)人(ren)也(ye)可以(yi)通(tong)过(guo)契(qi)约(yue)来寻求(qiu)到(dao)保(bao)护(hu)。而事实(shi)上,非股(gu)东的参(can)与(yu)(yu)(yu)(yu)人(ren)在利益受(shou)(shou)到(dao)损害时,由于其与(yu)(yu)(yu)(yu)股(gu)东参(can)与(yu)(yu)(yu)(yu)人(ren)之间难以(yi)达至(zhi)势均力(li)敌,多处于敌强(qiang)己(ji)弱的不利境地,欲借助契(qi)约(yue)保(bao)护(hu)自己(ji)实(shi)则困(kun)难重重,靠“无(wu)形的手”实(shi)质上无(wu)法平衡和保(bao)护(hu)其他(ta)(ta)参(can)与(yu)(yu)(yu)(yu)人(ren)的利益。

..............................


二、股东会(hui)与董事会(hui)的(de)分权(quan):确立(li)董事会(hui)优(you)位(wei)主义

(一)董事(shi)会优位主义与股东会优位主义的概念厘定

股(gu)东会(hui)(hui)优(you)位(wei)(wei)主(zhu)(zhu)(zhu)义(yi)(又(you)称之股(gu)东会(hui)(hui)中心主(zhu)(zhu)(zhu)义(yi))与董(dong)(dong)事(shi)会(hui)(hui)优(you)位(wei)(wei)主(zhu)(zhu)(zhu)义(yi)(又(you)称之董(dong)(dong)事(shi)会(hui)(hui)中心主(zhu)(zhu)(zhu)义(yi))耳熟能详(xiang),相关著述可谓(wei)汗牛充栋,但对于何谓(wei)股(gu)东会(hui)(hui)优(you)位(wei)(wei)主(zhu)(zhu)(zhu)义(yi)、董(dong)(dong)事(shi)会(hui)(hui)优(you)位(wei)(wei)主(zhu)(zhu)(zhu)义(yi)又(you)莫(mo)衷一是,总结概括言之,主(zhu)(zhu)(zhu)要有以下划分思(si)路:

一是(shi)从法(fa)律地位(wei)角度判(pan)断何者(zhe)为公司治理的(de)(de)中(zhong)心,此种(zhong)论述认为,股(gu)(gu)东(dong)会(hui)(hui)(hui)(hui)(hui)中(zhong)心主义(yi)就(jiu)是(shi)指股(gu)(gu)东(dong)会(hui)(hui)(hui)(hui)(hui)是(shi)董(dong)(dong)(dong)事(shi)(shi)会(hui)(hui)(hui)(hui)(hui)上(shang)位(wei)机关(guan)的(de)(de)这种(zhong)层级式(shi)的(de)(de)法(fa)律关(guan)系(xi),③而(er)董(dong)(dong)(dong)事(shi)(shi)会(hui)(hui)(hui)(hui)(hui)中(zhong)心主义(yi)则(ze)是(shi)指董(dong)(dong)(dong)事(shi)(shi)会(hui)(hui)(hui)(hui)(hui)与股(gu)(gu)东(dong)会(hui)(hui)(hui)(hui)(hui)处于平等(deng)位(wei)阶,董(dong)(dong)(dong)事(shi)(shi)会(hui)(hui)(hui)(hui)(hui)是(shi)与股(gu)(gu)东(dong)会(hui)(hui)(hui)(hui)(hui)相(xiang)独立(li)且地位(wei)相(xiang)当的(de)(de)公司机关(guan),④事(shi)(shi)实上(shang),这种(zhong)标准(zhun)的(de)(de)实质是(shi)董(dong)(dong)(dong)事(shi)(shi)会(hui)(hui)(hui)(hui)(hui)是(shi)否享(xiang)有(you)不受股(gu)(gu)东(dong)会(hui)(hui)(hui)(hui)(hui)改(gai)变的(de)(de)独立(li)决策权(quan)(quan),如果董(dong)(dong)(dong)事(shi)(shi)会(hui)(hui)(hui)(hui)(hui)摆脱对股(gu)(gu)东(dong)会(hui)(hui)(hui)(hui)(hui)的(de)(de)依(yi)附,享(xiang)有(you)独立(li)权(quan)(quan)限,即(ji)是(shi)指董(dong)(dong)(dong)事(shi)(shi)会(hui)(hui)(hui)(hui)(hui)享(xiang)有(you)不受股(gu)(gu)东(dong)会(hui)(hui)(hui)(hui)(hui)约束的(de)(de)最终决定权(quan)(quan)。

二是(shi)从权(quan)(quan)力(li)分配(pei)的(de)(de)(de)角度判断何者(zhe)为公(gong)(gong)司(si)(si)治理(li)的(de)(de)(de)中心,此(ci)种标(biao)准(zhun)主要(yao)探讨公(gong)(gong)司(si)(si)中股(gu)东(dong)会与董事会之间的(de)(de)(de)权(quan)(quan)限(xian)划(hua)分时,公(gong)(gong)司(si)(si)权(quan)(quan)力(li)的(de)(de)(de)配(pei)置(zhi)应当以(yi)前者(zhe)为主,还是(shi)说集中分配(pei)给后者(zhe),⑥将此(ci)种标(biao)准(zhun)更推进一步就是(shi)学者(zhe)所主张的(de)(de)(de)主要(yao)权(quan)(quan)力(li)配(pei)置(zhi)标(biao)准(zhun),如将股(gu)东(dong)会优位主义(yi)定义(yi)为“董事会除了享有一些日常经(jing)营事务的(de)(de)(de)权(quan)(quan)限(xian)之外,公(gong)(gong)司(si)(si)的(de)(de)(de)主要(yao)权(quan)(quan)力(li)应该配(pei)置(zhi)给股(gu)东(dong)会”的(de)(de)(de)模式,⑦而(er)“董事会中心主义(yi),是(shi)指事实上公(gong)(gong)司(si)(si)业务的(de)(de)(de)决策(ce)以(yi)及执(zhi)行之权(quan)(quan)限(xian)尽(jin)归(gui)公(gong)(gong)司(si)(si)董事会,股(gu)东(dong)会只保留最为基本的(de)(de)(de)几种决策(ce)权(quan)(quan)力(li)。

三是(shi)从剩余权力分配(pei)的角度进行判断(duan),①学者通(tong)常将法律和章(zhang)程(cheng)均未规定的权力称之为剩余权力,如果将其由董(dong)(dong)事(shi)会行使,则属于(yu)(yu)董(dong)(dong)事(shi)会优位(wei)主义,若归(gui)属于(yu)(yu)股东(dong)会行使,则属于(yu)(yu)股东(dong)会优位(wei)主义。

董事会经营决策权的体系构造

董事会经营决(jue)策权的体系构造

.................................


第三章  公开公司董事会经营决策权的法律构造 .......................32

一、确立上限:董事会与(yu)股东(dong)会经营(ying)决策权的重(zhong)构 .................... 32

(一)重构思(si)路 .............................. 32

(二)股(gu)东(dong)会固有(you)权(quan)力(li)的初步判断 .................................. 33

第四章 封闭公司董事会经营决策权的特殊性 ............................ 47

一、封闭公司经营决策权的配(pei)置(zhi) ........................ 47

(一(yi))封闭公司的治理 .................................. 47


第四章  封闭公司董事会经营决策权的特殊性


一、封闭公司经营决策(ce)权的配置

(一)封闭(bi)公(gong)司的治理

商(shang)业(ye)(ye)组(zu)(zu)(zu)织的发(fa)展是一个渐进的过程,封闭(bi)公司(si)处于合伙组(zu)(zu)(zu)织与公开公司(si)光谱的中间,①但其(qi)得到法律的认可却(que)比公开公司(si)晚。以美国法为例,最初出(chu)现的商(shang)业(ye)(ye)组(zu)(zu)(zu)织形式应(ying)属于合伙组(zu)(zu)(zu)

该论文为收费论文,请加QQ1135811234联系客服人员购买全文
S11比赛竞猜-S11赛事竞猜-S11全球总决赛竞猜官网-腾讯游戏 LOL竞猜-S11赛事竞猜-LOL竞猜官网 S11竞猜-S11赛事竞猜官网